Putin is resorting to preparations for further involuntary reserve call-ups from a place of weakness, as Russia is likely preparing to attempt to offset Russia’s near exhaustion of its expensive voluntary recruitment system in 2026. Putin has long been trying to balance “butter and guns” – the need to prevent societal discontent about another large-scale partial involuntary reserve call-up, the need to maintain the tempo of Russian offensive operations on the battlefield, and the need to maintain the workforce in both the civilian and defense industrial sectors of the already strained Russian economy.
The September 2022 partial call-up of 300,000 reservists led to widescale domestic backlash and the exodus of an estimated 700,000 to 900,000 economically mobile Russians from the country.[27] Putin must balance the workforce needs of the Russian economy, which Russian officials have stated will require at least 2.4 million additional workers by 2030.[28] Russia is already suffering from labor shortages, and the Kremlin has claimed that Russian manufacturing industries have a shortage of about 800,000 workers, while trade, construction, and service industries have a shortage of about 1.5 million workers — all due to Russia’s war effort.[29] A large-scale call-up would potentially take thousands of workers away from not only the civilian sectors of the economy, but the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), affecting Russia’s ability to produce enough materiel to maintain its battlefield tempo.
The Russian military must simultaneously maintain its force generation mechanisms to, at a minimum, replace Russia’s battlefield losses. Russian officials have indicated that Russia’s recruitment rate has been barely able to replace its monthly loss rates for much of the war, but Russia’s ability to recruit volunteers to fight in Ukraine appears to be slowing.


