A good discussion about the dominance of the AH64 Apache in a C-UAS role.

As a note the Longbow radar is absolutely as powerful as a fighter radar, that is what made it political in terms of interbranch military politics.

This agreement integrated the Armed Forces into an “efficient team of land, naval, and air forces,” and, within that arrangement, the Air Force was given a primary mission to furnish close combat and logistical air support to the Army, to include air lift, support, and resupply of airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical reconnaissance, and interdiction of enemy land power and communications.[7] Historically, CAS has been a function assigned to Air Force fixed wing aircraft. Assignment of CAS responsibility to the Air Force grew out of the Key West Agreement of 1948. Since that time, however, the nature of combat and weaponry has evolved to a high level of technological sophistication. This was illustrated in combat experiences, as in Just Cause in Panama and the Persian Gulf War.[8]

A similar conference to revise the agreement was proposed in 1993.[9]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_West_Agreement

What we are seeing right now is a longtail impact of these political and doctrine-policy choices having created an existential blindspot in most modern militaries to small, organic close air support, i.e. drones.

The Apache is the clear exception to that blindspot. It was never popular with fastjet folks and higher ups for fully integrating Close Air Support into the organic capability of an army including targetting and radar with the Longbow system.

War is politics all the way down and drones shatter the bullshit, that is why entrenched power structures have such a hard time understanding them.