In operational reality, manoeuvre warfare is not obsolete. Instead, it is being reshaped by a new balance between detection and denial. The contest is shifting toward who can better integrate drones, EW, deception, and armour within combined arms formations. Events on the battlefield in Ukraine suggest that advantage will accrue to forces capable of suppressing enemy sensors long enough to enable movement and mass effects at decisive points. While drones have raised the cost of manoeuvre, they have not eliminated its necessity.
The force design decisions made by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and its partner forces in NATO should not abandon armoured or manoeuvre formations. Rather they must invest in measures to restore manoeuvre under drone threat: counter-UAS, electronic warfare, smoke and obscuration, decoys, engineering support, and tighter integration of ISR and fires.
The current phase of the war thus reflects an adaptive struggle between surveillance and manoeuvre rather than a definitive victory for either.
Part 1