How can users confidently verify that a FOSS application is running from its published source code? Is there a easy way to check this, or is this based of checksum and hashes?

    • Lunch@lemmy.worldOP
      8·
      10 months ago

      Thanks for that. I’m honestly a bit surprised that there isn’t a more automatic way of checking this, like some sort of badge on Github or something.

      • poVoq@slrpnk.net
        25·
        10 months ago

        There is, its called a Linux distribution repository or F-Droid for Android.

        Why would you trust a badge on github if you don’t trust the original author to not tamper with the binaries? The only way is to either built from source yourself or get the binaries from a trusted 3rd party that does that.

          • poVoq@slrpnk.net
            71·
            10 months ago

            That is an unrelated topic. By using a distro you are already implicitly trusting them over the random author that publishes binaries on their repo or so.

            • rentar42@kbin.social
              6·
              10 months ago

              Yes, I agree with the trust and that it’s effectively equivalent for most users. But I read OPs reply as asking specifically for “a more automatic way of checking (that it was build from source cleanly)”.

              I think expecting that this has already been cleanly solved years ago is not unreasonable (until you realize how many rabbit holes this whole topic has to go down to work well).

  • jet@hackertalks.comEnglish
    25·
    10 months ago

    F Droid is as close as you’re going to get. They take open source projects and build them independently and then publish. So if you trust f Droid, then the code you get from f Droid is the right code, and the binary you get from Android is the right binary.

    • SpeakinTelnet@sh.itjust.works
      6·
      10 months ago

      Fdroid is great but OPs question is even more important then, installing an installer app without knowing its legitimacy could lead to many apps being infected.

      • jet@hackertalks.comEnglish
        4·
        10 months ago

        Sure, its about who you trust in this scenario. once you introduce a compiler it becomes unprovable. So what your threat model is, and who you can trust.

  • aurtzy@discuss.tchncs.de
    10·
    10 months ago

    You might find The Full-Source Bootstrap: Building from source all the way down by some of the GNU Guix maintainers of interest to read, which discusses how Guix is attempting to solve the “trusting trust” attack some have mentioned here.

    Although I haven’t used it myself yet, Guix actually has a feature that lets you “challenge” the build servers to see if your builds match the pre-built binaries (the command being aptly named guix challenge).

    • theshatterstone54@feddit.uk
      1·
      10 months ago

      Do you use Guix? I’ve found it quite interesting and I’d love to try it out one day. The thing is, I need the mainline Linux kernel for some proprietary drivers.

      • aurtzy@discuss.tchncs.deEnglish
        4·
        10 months ago

        I do!

        For starters, you’re not required to install Guix System in order to use the Guix package manager itself; the manual provides instructions for installing it on top of your existing system here if you want to use it but not fully commit (you can do this with Nix too).

        Guix allows for adding new sources to pull packages from using channels. The nonguix channel provides the Linux kernel - blobs and all - as well as other stuff that won’t be upstreamed, like Steam and NVIDIA drivers.

        I recommend this helpful series by System Crafters, which includes a few guides on installing Guix and Guix System with the full Linux kernel.

  • rentar42@kbin.social
    10·
    10 months ago

    As the article/SO answer posted by cwagner tells you you effectively can’t, because a “trojan” could be injected at many different levels and even self-compiling the source code depends on some compiler binary that you have to get from somewhere (build your own compiler, you tell me, but what do you use to compile THAT?).

    In practice for most people the correct answer is “get the binary from your distributions normal repository”. By using a given distribution you already implicitly trust that distribution (because if you don’t, why use it?), so non-core software from their repository should also be considered trustworthy (at least in the sense that no additional trojans were introduced that aren’t in the source).

    That doesn’t really help with Windows, though. There your best bet is to get a binary that’s from as close to the original authors themselves. Ideally from their project home page themselves.